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A rich theoretical literature describes the disadvantages facing plaintiffs who
suffer multiple, or intersecting, axes of discrimination. This article extends
extant literature by distinguishing two forms of intersectionality: demographic
intersectionality, in which overlapping demographic characteristics produce
disadvantages that are rnore than the sum of their parts, and claim intersec-
tionality, in which plaintiffs who allege discrimination on the basis of intersect-
ing ascriptive characteristics (e.g., race and sex) are unlikely to win their cases.
To date, there has been virtually no empirical research on the effects of either
type of intersectionality on litigation outcomes. This article addresses that
lacuna with an empirical analysis of a representative sample of judicial opin-
ions in equal employment opportunity (EEO) cases in the U.S. federal courts
from 1965 through 1999. Using generalized ordered logistic regression and
controlling for numerous variables, we find that both intersectional demo-
graphic characteristics and legal claims are associated with dramatically
reduced odds of plaintiff victory. Strikingly, plaintiffs who make intersectional
claims are only half as likely to win their cases as plaintiffs who allege a single
basis of discrimination. Our findings support and elaborate predictions about
the sociolegal effects of intersectionality.
Twenty years ago, Kimberl6 Crenshaw introduced the idea that
civil rights laws are ill equipped to address the types of inequality
and discrimination faced by people who suffer multiple, or "inter-
secting," axes of discrimination (Crenshaw 1989). Her work has
inspired two decades of research on intersectionality in many fields,
including critical race theory, stratification, social psychology, and
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women's studies. Yet despite the richness of the theoretical schol-
arship on the legal disadvantages confronted by women of color,
there has been virtually no empirical research that addresses the
effects of intersectionality on litigation outcomes.
This article addresses that lacuna by examining the effects of
intersectional demographic characteristics and intersectional legal
claims on plaintiffs' likelihood of success in discrimination lawsuits.
Using a representative sample of judicial opinions over 35 years of
federal employment discrimination litigation, we show that non-
white women are less likely to win their cases than is any other
demographic group. Additionally, plaintiffs who make intersec-
tional claims, alleging that they were discriminated against based
on more than one ascriptive characteristic, are only half as likely to
win their cases as are other plaintiffs. Our results suggest that
antidiscrimination lawsuits provide the least protection for those
who already suffer multiple social disadvantages, thus limiting the
capacity of civil rights law to produce social change.
Limitations of Civil Rights Law
Federal equal employment opportunity (EEO) laws attempt to
prevent and redress discrimination in employment, a major source
of economic and social inequality. A growing body of literature
analyzes the capacity and limitations of EEO law to ameliorate
inequality in the workplace. EEO law has, to some extent,
improved women's and nonwhites' position in the labor market
and workforce (Beller 1982; Burstein & Edwards 1994; Eberts &
Stone 1985; Heckman & Verkerke 1990; Leonard 1984, 1986;
Skaggs 2008, 2009). However, a large body of legal and sociolegal
literature highlights the many limitations of civil rights law in
redressing inequalities at work. Some limitations stem from power
disparities in litigation. Sociologists of law point out that the rights-
mobilization process, in which victims must generally perceive
rights violations and endure the prolonged and costly process of
litigation in order to realize the benefits of legal rights, tends to
penalize precisely those who rights are intended to benefit: indi-
viduals with fewer social, economic, and political resources (Albis-
ton 1999, 2005; Bumiller 1987, 1988; Felstiner et al. 1980/198 1;
Galanter 1974; Marshall 2005; Miller & Sarat 1980; Nielsen 2004a,
2004b; Nielsen et al. 2010; Scheingold 1974). A second set of limi-
tations of EEO law's potential to redress inequalities stems from
mismatches between discrimination as conceptualized by law and
discrimination as experienced in the workplace. EEO law generally
conceptualizes discrimination as intentional, disregards its struc-
tural forms, and fails to recognize how employment practices
sustain patterns of market-based discrimination (Haney Lopez
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2000; Krieger 1995; Nelson & Bridges 1999; Schultz 1990; Schultz
& Petterson 1992; Sturm 2001; Sturm & Guinier 1996). Addition-
ally, courts may help to institutionalize ineffective organizational
responses to law by deferring to compliance structures that sym-
bolize attention to law but are ineffective at combating discrimina-
tion (Edelman 2005, 2007; Edelman et al. 1999, 2011; Kalev et al.
2006).
In this article, we turn our attention to a stumbling block for
EEO law that has received much attention in critical race and
feminist scholarship but relatively little attention in empirical analy-
ses of inequality in the courts: intersectionality. As described below,
intersectionality disadvantages plaintiffs both as a source of inequal-
ity in litigation and as a mismatch between legal conceptualizations
and actual experiences of discrimination.
Twenty years of work by sociolegal scholars suggests that plain-
tiffs who face multiple disadvantages fare less well in civil rights
litigation than do plaintiffs who suffer a single form of social disad-
vantage (Austin 1989; Caldwell 1991; Carbado & Gulati 2001;
Crenshaw 1989, 1991, 1992; Harris 1997; Roberts 1991; Smith
1991; Wei 1996; Williams 1991). The key insight of intersectionality
theory is that discrimination and disadvantage are not just additive;
categories may intersect to produce unique forms of disadvantage.
For example, an employer might hire both white women and black
men but refuse to hire black women because he stereotypes them as
desperate single mothers (Kennelly 1999); since this stereotype is
specific to black women, it cannot be explained as the summed
effects of racism and sexism.'
Intersectionality theorists have suggested two distinct processes
through which people facing multiple disadvantages are subordi-
nated in the courts, but have not explicitly distinguished between
these types, causing some confusion. To highlight the fact that
intersectional disadvantages comprise two distinct mechanisms of
subordination, we formulate and investigate two different con-
structs: demographic intersectionality, in which the courts are the
site of intersectional disadvantages or discrimination, and claim
intersectionality, in which the law does not adequately redress inter-
sectional discrimination that occurs in the labor market. Demo-
graphic intersectionality can be thought of as a type of inequality in
litigation, while claim intersectionality can be thought of as a mis-
match between discrimination as conceptualized by law and dis-
crimination as experienced in the labor market.
1 Although the concept of intersectionality can apply to any intersecting ascriptive
characteristics, the bulk of the literature focuses on black women. Here, we use black




Demographic intersectionality disadvantages occur when dis-
crimination and/or stereotyping targets plaintiffs who occupy the
intersection of two or more demographic categories. For these
plaintiffs, overlapping axes of disadvantage may add up to more
than the sum of their parts. Articulating the mechanisms through
which intersectional stereotypes operate, social psychologists find
that people sometimes merge information from multiple categories
to create subcategories with attendant stereotypes (Bodenhausen
2010; Roccas & Brewer 2002), and that information about charac-
teristics or roles can take on new meanings when nested within
other categorical formations (Hutter & Crisp 2005; Kunda &
Thagard 1996; Richards & Hewstone 2001; Ridgeway 1997;
Stangor et al. 1992). By demonstrating that status characteristics
are not always perceived independently, this experimental research
suggests that intersectional stereotypes are likely to emerge and to
influence social perception and judgment.
Indeed, recent empirical research on hiring and discrimination
provides evidence that employers hold discrete stereotypes for
various intersectional categories. Employers may stereotype inner-
city blacks (but not necessarily other blacks or white inner-city
residents) as lazy and dangerous (Kirschenman & Neckerman
1991; Moss & Tilly 2001). Employers also hold different stereotypes
about black men and black women. They sometimes stereotype
black women negatively as desperate single mothers (Kennelly
1999) or positively as responsible "matriarchs" (Shih 2002: 111).
Black men, on the other hand, are stereotyped as "unmanageable
workers [who are] more likely to resist authority" (Shih 2002: 102).
Using census data, Kaufman (2002) concludes that employers often
have preconceived notions about which race and sex combinations
are right for ajob and tend to select job applicants who match these
stereotypes. Interview-based research and audit studies confirm
that employers prefer to hire white men for low-skilled jobs (Moss
& Tilly 2001; Turner et al. 1991).
Judges, juries, and lawyers are subject to the same institution-
alized stereotypes as are employers. If they introduce these stere-
otypes into legal decisionmaking, the types of stereotypes discussed
in the literature on labor-market discrimination may also affect
court outcomes, with courts replicating the discriminatory practices
that operate in the labor market.
Claim Intersectionality
Claim intersectionality is present when plaintiffs allege discrimi-
nation on the basis of two or more ascriptive characteristics. Critical
race theorists have argued that since antidiscrimination law organ-
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izes demographic traits into formal, one-dimensional categories-
race, sex, national origin, and so forth-legal doctrine often fails to
capture the types of discrimination suffered by intersectional sub-
jects (Austin 1989; Caldwell 1991; Crenshaw 1989; Harris 1990;
Roberts 1991). So, for example, sex discrimination is conceptual-
ized in antidiscrimination case law as a problem affecting all women
equally and in the same ways (with white women as the prototypic
case), while race discrimination is understood as affecting all blacks
(prototypically male) in the same ways (Crenshaw 1989; Harris
1990). Intersectionality theorists argue that this one-dimensional,
categorical approach to understanding discrimination prevents
civil rights law from adequately protecting members of groups that
experience more than one axis of prejudice.
For example, an employer might be willing to hire black men
and white women as retail salespeople but unwilling to hire black
women because he thinks that customers will stereotype them in
disparaging ways that will harm his business (Smith 1991: 28). Or,
as another example, an employer might fire a black female
employee because the employer is discomfited by her Afrocentric
feminine attire or hairstyle (Caldwell 1991). Their employees might
make what we call intersectional claims: allegations that they were
discriminated against due to more than one ascriptive characteris-
tic. But since these types of discrimination would not affect minority
men or white women, under some interpretations of EEO law, the
employer could parry a claim of race discrimination by pointing to
the hiring of men belonging to the plaintiffs racial group and
deflect a claim of sex discrimination by pointing to his hiring of
white women (Crenshaw 1989; Harris 1990; Smith 1991).
Thus, plaintiffs who make intersectional discrimination claims
may be less likely to win their cases not only because they are
members of particularly derogated subgroups, but also because,
given the categorical nature of discrimination law, intersectional
claims are particularly hard to establish. While demographic inter-
sectionality can produce unequal outcomes in all arenas of social
life, claim intersectionality is a mechanism of disadvantage that is
particular to civil rights litigation.
Lack of Empirical Research on Intersectionality and
Litigation Outcomes
Although a substantial and rich literature describes the nature
of intersectionality and demonstrates how intersectionality has
penalized plaintiffs in particular cases, there has been no systematic
effort to determine the extent to which intersectionality penalizes
plaintiffs in litigation generally. Regarding demographic intersec-
tionality, some studies have compared litigation outcomes across
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gender or racial groups, but most studies have examined race and
gender disparities separately, comparing all men to all women or
comparing all racial minorities to all whites (Babcock 1993; Nelson
1994; Resnik 1991; Schafran 1998; Selby 1999). Since they ignore
the intersection of race and gender, these studies may elide impor-
tant differences among subgroups, and we remain in the dark
about whether race disparities are constant across gender, and vice
versa. One exception to this trend is Oppenheimer (2003), who
examined a sample of 334 employment-discrimination and
wrongful-discharge cases tried in the California state courts and
found that black women had low win rates in cases alleging sex
discrimination or race discrimination. While these results suggest
that plaintiffs with intersecting disadvantaged statuses may fare
worse in the California state courts, the study did not test whether
the differences were statistically significant or control for other
characteristics of the cases. To fully examine demographic intersec-
tionality, we must statistically compare outcomes for white men,
white women, nonwhite men, and nonwhite women.
Claim intersectionality has attracted more scholarly attention in
the form of several qualitative analyses of employment discrimina-
tion opinions by critical race theorists (Crenshaw 1989; Cunning-
ham 1998; Scales-Trent 1989; Smith 1991). This work highlights a
series of judicial opinions with widely varying treatment of inter-
sectional claims. In some cases, judges have not recognized inter-
sectional claims as being legally cognizable and have dismissed
them at the outset. Crenshaw's (1989) foundational article on inter-
sectionality, for example, centers on the case of DeGraffenreid v.
General Motors (1976), in which the plaintiffs established that GM
had not hired any black female workers before 1964 and that all the
black women hired after 1970 had lost their jobs in a later seniority-
based layoff. The court ruled that black women were not a pro-
tected class under Title VII. Since the company had hired white
women, no sex discrimination had occurred. Since the company
had hired black men, no race discrimination had occurred either. A
similar fate befell black female plaintiffs in Jewel C. Rich v. Martin
Marietta (1975), Ella Logan v. St. Luke's Hospital Center (1977), and
Mary M. Love v. Alamance County Board of Education (1984), where
the judges also considered race and sex claims separately and
disregarded statistical evidence of discrimination against black
women as legally irrelevant.2
2 In these cases, black female plaintiffs alleging race and sex discrimination were at a
disadvantage because the courts considered each type of discrimination separately. Cren-
shaw (1989) describes another pattern of rulings in which black women were not allowed to
represent all women or all blacks in class-action lawsuits. Our data do not allow us to
observe the latter pattern; our measure of claim intersectionality focuses only on the former.
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However, in other opinions, the courts have been sympathetic
to intersectional claims. In Jefferies v. Harris County Community
Action Association (1980), the court ruled that "discrimination
against black females can exist even in the absence of discrimina-
tion against black men or white women" (quoted in Scales-Trent
1989: 17). Similarly, in reversing the district court's grant of
summary judgment in Lam v. University of Hawai'i (1994), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit criticized the district court
for imagining that racism and sexism can be evaluated separately.
Finally, some opinions are mixed. In judge v. Marsh (1986), the
court stated that it would consider intersections of two character-
istics but not three or more, out of the concern that considering
too many intersections would turn Title VII into a "many-headed
Hydra" and make it impossible to make any employment deci-
sions "without incurring a volley of discrimination charges"
(quoted in Scales-Trent 1989: 37).
These cases reveal the courts' varying responses to intersec-
tional claims but leave broader patterns obscure: How many plain-
tiffs are bringing intersectional claims? On the whole, are plaintiffs
who bring intersectional claims less likely to win their cases? And if
so, can any other characteristics of the cases explain this disadvan-
tage? These questions can best be addressed through quantitative
empirical research. However, to date, there has been very little
empirical research on the effects of claim intersectionality on
litigation outcomes. To our knowledge only one preliminary
empirical analysis speaks directly to this question. Kotkin (2009)
examined 26 employment discrimination summary judgment
adjudications in the federal district courts for the Southern and
Eastern Districts of New York in which plaintiffs presented
multiple-basis claims. These plaintiffs lost the defense motion for
summary judgment 96 percent of the time, which is higher than
plaintiff loss rates reported by other studies of summary judgment
outcomes, providing suggestive evidence that plaintiffs alleging
multiple bases of discrimination fare poorly. However, the study
did not include a comparison group of single-basis claims, thus
leaving it unclear whether plaintiffs alleging single bases of dis-
crimination fared better, and if so, whether the differences were
statistically significant. Documenting claim-intersectionality disad-
vantages requires systematically testing whether intersectional
claims fare worse than other claims do.
Thus, no existing research systematically compares intersec-
tional and nonintersectional cases and tests whether intersectional
cases fare significantly worse. Our analysis addresses the lacuna of
empirical data and findings on this issue by investigating intersec-
tionality disadvantages using a probability sample of federal civil
rights opinions.
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The Politics of Methods in Intersectionality Scholarship
The lack of quantitative empirical work on intersectionality is
due in part to methodological conflicts within critical race scholar-
ship. The first point of controversy centers on how to use categories
in research on intersectionality. Scholars who believe that the main
contribution of intersectionality theory is the documentation of the
detrimental effects of categorization are loath to use their own work
to divide people into categories. Additionally, some scholars suggest
that intersectionality cannot be captured through an interaction
effect because the social construction of categories is contingent
and fluid (Collins 1990; King 1988; West & Fenstermaker 1995).
However, other researchers defend the importance of using catego-
ries to document inequalities (McCall 2001, 2005).
The second point of disagreement centers on research
methods. Critical race scholars who study intersectionality use
almost exclusively qualitative and interpretive methods (Abrams
1994; Austin 1989; Caldwell 1991; Crenshaw 1989, 1991, 1992;
Delgado 1995; Roberts 1991; Smith 1991; Williams 1991). Many
critical race scholars criticize quantitative research as overly simplis-
tic and positivist (Davis 2008; McCall 2005). However, a smaller
group of researchers criticizes the exclusive use of qualitative
methods for providing inadequate documentation of inequalities
(Nash 2008), argues for the use of statistics to document differing
outcomes among groups (Baldus et al. 1990; McCall 2005), and
calls for greater dialogue between critical race theory and empirical
research on law and society (Gomez 2004).
We argue that these conflicts can be resolved by recognizing
that the best method of analysis depends on the nature of the
research question and the dependent variable. While qualitative
research is most appropriate for in-depth studies of experiences
and identities (Harvey 2005; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001), quantitative
research may be best suited to documenting the aggregate patterns
that constitute between-group inequalities (McCall 2001, 2005;
Yuval-Davis 2006). While racial, sex, or other categories certainly
do not richly describe people's experiences and identities, differing
outcomes across these categories are important indicators of struc-
tural inequality and social stratification. Additionally, as the social
categories on which discrimination is often based and through
which legal claims must be pursued, these categories have real
effects.
While there is an extensive research literature exploring inter-
sectional experiences and identities, researchers have rarely sought
to document the effects of intersectionality on inequality (Browne &
I Some researchers also find a middle ground between deconstructing categories and
adopting them completely (McCall 2005).
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Misra 2003). Attributing this neglect to methodological prefer-
ences, McCall argues that suspicion of statistics has "restrict[ed] the
scope of knowledge that can be produced on intersectionality"
(McCall 2005: 1772). This neglect is so extreme that the hypothesis
that Crenshaw (1989) introduces in her foundational article on
intersectionality-that intersectional plaintiffs fare worse in dis-
crimination lawsuits-has not been systematically tested. Our study
is designed to test this hypothesis.
Methods
Sample
Our study draws upon a representative sample ofjudicial opin-
ions in EEO cases, allowing us to provide generalizable findings on
patterns in EEO decisions. We first retrieved all federal employ-
ment opinions decided by the U.S. district and circuit courts
between 1965 and 1999 and available in the Westlaw database,
which yielded a sampling frame of over 50,000 opinions.4 We then
selected a 2 percent random sample, yielding 328 circuit court
opinions and 686 district court opinions.5
Our sample is unique in its inclusion of opinions from both the
district and the circuit courts. The few previous empirical studies
of civil rights judicial opinions focus only on the Supreme Court
and federal circuit courts (Burstein & Edwards 1994; Burstein &
Monaghan 1986). While appellate opinions establish precedent and
therefore become the "leading cases," the district courts handle
many more cases, making them the primary federal locale for civil
rights dispute resolution. Thus, including the district courts pro-
vides important information on civil rights conflict resolution
where it more frequently occurs.6
It is important to note that while our sample is representative of
judicial opinions, it is not representative of all instances of discrimi-
Since Lexis and Westlaw include many of the same opinions, we sample only from
the Westlaw database to avoid duplication. We used a broad search term in order to include
all federal civil rights decisions issued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, two post-Civil
War Civil Rights Acts, and 42 U.S.C. Sections 1981 and 1983.
' Once the initial sample was selected, we read each opinion and rejected those that (a)
were not principally about civil rights, (b) did not involve adjudication on the merits of the
case, or (c) arose from an appeal of a decision by the Merit Systems Protection Board.
Rejected cases were replaced with the next case in chronological order. For this analysis, we
also dropped 10 cases with missing data.
6 We did not include Supreme Court cases because they are few in number and we
wanted to examine the impact of major Supreme Court decisions on our dependent
variables.
1000 Multiple Disadvantages
nation or charges filed.' Large-scale surveys tell the story of a
"dispute pyramid" (Miller & Sarat 1980) in which judicial opinions
reflect only the tip of the iceberg. Only 5 percent of perceived
instances of employment discrimination evolve into court filings
(Miller & Sarat 1980), and almost 60 percent of employment dis-
crimination cases filed in federal court settle (Nielsen et al. 2010).'
Intersectional plaintiffs may well be disadvantaged at all stages of
the dispute pyramid, but since our focus is on plaintiffs' likelihood
of success when their cases reach a judge, we do not include these
earlier stages in our study.
Coding
We coded each opinion for court (which circuit or which dis-
trict), judges, plaintiff characteristics, defendant characteristics,
statutory claims involved in the case, challenged actions, legal theo-
ries on which the claims were based, which party prevailed (and the
extent to which they prevailed), and a variety of other variables.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the
analysis. Given the complexity of our coding scheme, we took
numerous measures to ensure intercoder reliability. We developed
and refined the coding scheme through an iterative procedure
involving trial coding of opinions by five researchers over a period
of about one year and then ran a series of reliability checks to
ensure that there were no systematic differences among the
coders.'
Dependent Variable: Who Wins
Our dependent variable is who wins the case. This variable has
three categories: employer wins (N = 595), mixed outcomes in
' Siegelman and Donohue (1990) note that the cases available in online databases are
a biased sample of cases filed. However, most of this bias is due to the fact that most cases
drop out before requiring a judicial decision, usually due to settlement. Westlaw attempts
to include every federal decision, including those that are not legally "published," increas-
ing the extent to which our sample is representative of all judicial opinions.
' Some cases result in judicial opinions before eventually settling (e.g., a case that
survived a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment and later was settled).
Other settled cases never result in judicial opinions and so would not be included in our
sample.
I Each week, five researchers independently coded five opinions, discussed discrep-
ancies, and refined the coding scheme. This process was repeated until the five researchers
reached agreement percentages of approximately 90 percent for all codes. One of the
researchers then completed all of the circuit court coding. Next, district court coders, all of
whom had completed a course in EEO law, underwent 100 hours of coding training. They
began actual coding once their agreement percentages with previous codes consistently
exceeded 80 percent. Finally, 5 percent of the district court opinions were randomly
selected and recoded, and reliability checks showed no systematic discrepancies and over 90
percent agreement.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Percent Mean (SD)
















Section 1981 and Title VII claims 19%
Section 1981 and Title VII x intersectional claim 6%
Judicial deference to employer's structures 27%
Resources
Plaintiff is a union member 17%
Government or public-interest lawyer representation of 9%
or amicus for plaintiff
Plaintiff's occupational prestige (missing set to mean) 47 (12.8)
Prestige missing 21%
Motion/procedural posture
Motion to dismiss 5%
Employer's motion for summaryjudgment 51%
Other control variables
Number of challenged employer actions' 1.69 (.98)
Circuit court (circuit court = 1, district court 0) 32%
Published case 56%
Length of opinion (pages) 6.92 (6.77)
Post-1986 71%
More than one ascriptive characteristic (race, sex, age, or national origin)
2E.g., race and retaliation
'E.g., hiring, termination, compensation
which both parties win something on the principle (N = 147), and
employee wins (N = 280)."o In all analyses, we first examine plain-
tiffs' odds of achieving at least a partial victory and then move on to
measure plaintiffs' odds of a complete victory.
Independent Variables
Claim Intersectionality
Claim-intersectionality theory suggests that plaintiffs are at
a disadvantage when they allege intersectional discrimination,
1o We code mixed outcomes where the employer won on the principle (N = 5) as
employer victories, and mixed outcomes where the employee won on the principle (N = 48)
as employee victories.
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Table 2. Number of Sampled Cases with Various Bases of Discrimination
Bases of Number of Cases
Discrimination Alleged (Percent of Sample)
Race and sex 60 (6%)
Race and age 21(2%)
Race and national origin 29 (3%)
Sex and age 28 (3%)
Sex and national origin 3 (<1%)
Age and national origin 9 (1%)
Three- and four-way intersections 28 (3%)
Total 178(18%)
regardless of their demographic characteristics. We observe claim
intersectionality when a plaintiff alleges discrimination based on
more than one of the following ascriptive characteristics: race, sex,
age, or national origin." Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for
the specific intersections in our sample. The intersection of race
and sex accounted for one-third of intersectional claims, and race
and age, race and national origin, sex and age, and three- and
four-way intersections also appeared relatively frequently.
Instead of using an interaction effect, as we do to measure
demographic intersectionality (see below), we measure claim inter-
sectionality using three mutually exclusive dummy variables. We
distinguish intersectional claims from cases where plaintiffs allege
only one basis of discrimination and also from cases where plaintiffs
allege multiple nonintersectional bases of discrimination (that is,
more than one basis of discrimination of which only one or none
are ascriptive characteristics). For instance, a case with allegations of
race and sex discrimination is coded as intersectional, while a case
with allegations of race discrimination and retaliation is not. By this
definition, 18 percent of cases in our sample make intersectional
claims (see Table 1).12
Demographic Intersectionality
Demographic intersectionality theory yields the hypothesis that
various axes of disadvantage (race, sex, age, sexuality, and so on) do
not operate independently in the courts. All our data on plaintiffs'
demographics are coded from judicial opinions, which rarely
" The bases of discrimination that we do not call ascriptive characteristics are retali-
ation, religion, disability, family and medical leave, and pregnancy.
2 Some allegations of discrimination based on multiple ascriptive characteristics make
explicitly intersectional claims (e.g., that an employer hires black men and white women but
refuses to hire black women), while others make tacitly intersectional claims (e.g., that an
employer refuses to hire black women). We categorize both types of cases as making
intersectional claims because intersectionality theory suggests that both should result in a
reduced likelihood of plaintiff success.
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mention demographic characteristics other than race or sex. Thus,
although demographic intersectionality theory could apply to the
intersection of any demographic characteristics, we can only test it
for the intersection of race and sex. Our data are further limited by
the fact that the plaintiffs' race and sex are not always mentioned in
the judicial opinions. In 40 opinions, we could not determine the
plaintiffs' sex. Additionally, 57 cases involved a mixed-sex group of
plaintiffs or an organizational plaintiff. We combined these two
types of cases into a "missing sex" group that makes up 9.5 percent
of the sample (see Table 1)." Our data on the plaintiffs' races are
sparser. Thirty-two cases involved a racially mixed group of plain-
tiffs. In an additional 579 opinions, the plaintiffs' races were not
mentioned. We combine racially mixed groups of plaintiffs and
plaintiffs whose race was not mentioned into a "missing race" cat-
egory that comprises 60 percent of our sample (see Table 1). We
originally coded plaintiffs' races into six categories," but our
sample is too small to examine each racial category separately.
Therefore, we compare the 60 plaintiffs we can identify as white to
the 353 plaintiffs we can identify as nonwhite, a category that
includes blacks, Hispanics, Asians and Pacific Islanders, Native
Americans, and plaintiffs of other nonwhite races (see Table 1).
Most of the plaintiffs we can identify as nonwhite are black (84
percent). To see whether patterns differed between blacks and
other minorities, we also ran our models with three racial categories
and found no important differences.5
As might be expected, most opinions that mentioned the plain-
tiffs' races resulted from cases alleging race or national origin dis-
crimination. Of the 353 plaintiffs we can identify as nonwhite, 320
alleged discrimination on the basis of race or national origin. We
were concerned that the 33 opinions in which judges mentioned
the plaintiffs race even though the plaintiff was not alleging racial
or national origin discrimination might be unusual cases or might
differ in some way from race and national origin cases. Therefore,
we reran all analyses with interaction effects between the race
variables and whether the case included race or national origin
claims; our substantive results were unchanged."
Thus, our data on plaintiffs' demographic characteristics are
more limited than our data on intersectional claims: we only have
" In four cases, the plaintiff was identified as a gender other than male or female.
Since this group of cases was too small to analyze separately, we include them with the
"missing gender" group for the purpose of the statistical analyses.
14 White (N = 60); black (N = 295); Hispanic (N = 31); Asian/Pacific Islander (N = 11);
Native American (N = 2); Other race (N = 14).
' Results available from the authors upon request.
'" Results available from the authors upon request.
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Table 3. Overlap between Nonwhite Female Plaintiffs and Intersectional
Claims
Intersectional Claim Other Claim Total
Nonwhite female plaintiff 45 (42%) 62 (58%) 918 (100%)
Other plaintiff 133 (14%) 785 (86%) 107 (100%)
Total 178 (17%) 847 (83%)
measures of plaintiffs' race and sex, and even that information is
missing for a large proportion of plaintiffs. However, since we take
care to distinguish between plaintiffs with missing and nonmissing
data, we can draw some conclusions about the effects of race and
sex on litigation outcomes. To test the hypothesis that race- and
sex-based disadvantages do not operate independently in the
courts, we ran regressions with variables for plaintiffs' race and sex
and an interaction effect between race and sex. This modeling
strategy distinguishes between white male, white female, nonwhite
male, and nonwhite female plaintiffs, and plaintiffs with unknown
race or sex.
Overlap between Claim and Demographic Intersectionality
Claim intersectionality and demographic intersectionality
overlap but are not perfectly correlated. Nonwhite female plaintiffs
are more likely to make intersectional claims than are other plain-
tiffs. However, not all nonwhite female plaintiffs make intersec-
tional claims (for instance, a black female plaintiff might sue for race
discrimination alone), and not all intersectional claims are brought
by nonwhite women (for instance, a claim of race and age discrimi-
nation might be brought by a black man, or a white man might
claim reverse race and sex discrimination). Table 3 shows the
extent to which the categories overlap. We hypothesize that demo-
graphic and claim intersectionality are two separate processes of
disadvantage: intersectional claims will be less likely to succeed,
regardless of plaintiffs' demographic characteristics, and race and
sex disadvantages will intersect in the courts regardless of whether
plaintiffs make intersectional claims.
Mediating Variables
While we theorize that demographic and claim intersectionality
can operate separately, we also test whether either one mediates the
other by testing their effects on case outcome separately and then
including both in the same model. Additionally, we explore several
other potential mediating variables.
Smith (1991) suggests that plaintiffs may be especially unlikely to
prevail when they file an intersectional claim under Title VII
and a race claim under Section 1981, which applies only to race
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discrimination. When plaintiffs fail to prove race discrimination
under Section 198 1, judges may throw out the race portion of their
Title VII claims." Smith argues that by mistakenly assuming that
intersectional race and sex claims under Title VII can be considered
separately, these judges prevent intersectional claims from getting a
fair hearing. To test Smith's hypothesis that the combination of
Section 1981 and Title VII is disadvantageous for plaintiffs making
intersectional claims, we created a variable indicating whether the
case includes claims brought under both statutes and an interaction
effect between this variable and claim intersectionality.
Another potential mediating variable is judicial deference to
institutionalized organizational structures. Judicial deference occurs
when judges take the mere presence of organizational structures
as evidence of an organization's compliance with civil rights law
irrespective of whether the structures actually protect employees
(Edelman et al. 1999; Edelman et al. 2011). For example, despite the
fact that civil rights law neither mandates the creation of organiza-
tional grievance procedures nor specifies that these structures con-
stitute evidence of nondiscrimination, and despite the fact that many
organizational grievance procedures are ineffective at reducing dis-
crimination (Edelman 1992; Edelman et al. 1993), courts have
become increasingly likely over time to accept the presence of formal
grievance procedures as evidence of nondiscrimination without
evaluating their effectiveness (Bisom-Rapp 1999, 2001; Edelman
et al. 1999). Given research that suggests that judges are often
intuitive decision makers and that intuitions are often flawed
(Guthrie et al. 2007), institutionalized organizational structures may
provide a heuristic mechanism through which judges are more likely
to assume fair governance when they are more skeptical of the
plaintiffs or the claims. Kotkin (2009) notes that some federal judges
treat plaintiffs who make intersectional claims like "the child who
cried wolf " (Kotkin 2009: 1458). If judges are skeptical about the
existence of intersectional discrimination, they may be predisposed
to seek out signs that employers charged with intersectional discrimi-
nation are rational and nondiscriminatory. Increased likelihood of
judicial deference-using structures as symbolic indicia of fair treat-
ment instead of considering evidence as to whether they reduce
discrimination-may indicate a subtle shift in judges' symbolic con-
struction of plaintiffs and defendants. Thus, if deference mediates
the effect of claim intersectionality, this would indicate that judges'
subjective constructions of intersectional claims account for some of
intersectional plaintiffs' disadvantage.
17 For instance, in Richardson v. Steak 'N Shake, Inc. (1987), the court concluded that
since a jury had ruled against the plaintiffs Section 1981 race claim, the court could
consider only the sex discrimination portion of her race/sex Title VII claim (Smith 1991).
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Another set of potential mediating variables measures plaintiffs'
resources. While we cannot measure all aspects of plaintiffs'
resources, we coded for three variables that shed some light on
resources: unionization, involvement of government or public-
interest organizations, and occupational prestige. Our first measure,
unionization, is a dummy variable equal to one if thejudicial opinion
mentions that any of the plaintiffs were union members. Second,
since government or public-interest organizations can provide a
substantial legal advantage to plaintiffs, we created a dummy vari-
able equal to one if (a) the plaintiff is a government agency or
public-interest organization, (b) the plaintiff is represented by a
public-interest organization, or (c) a government or public-interest
organization filed an amicus brief for the plaintiff. Third, we coded
for plaintiffs' occupational prestige using 1980 census occupational
categories and the 1989 General Social Survey (GSS) occupational
prestige scale (Nakao & Treas 1992).18 While no single measure can
capture all aspects of occupational status, we expect occupational
prestige rankings to be correlated with economic and cultural
resources that can help plaintiffs succeed in court. If plaintiffs with
particular race and sex characteristics or plaintiffs who bring inter-
sectional claims tend to have fewer resources, then controlling for
unionization, organizational involvement, and occupational prestige
should decrease the size of the intersectionality coefficients.
Crenshaw and colleagues argue that doctrinal barriers and
evidentiary hurdles diminish the success rates for intersectional
claims. Doctrinal barriers stem from the categorical nature of dis-
crimination law, and evidentiary hurdles from the difficulty of
proving complex claims. For example, proving that nonwhite
women were less likely to be promoted requires a large enough
sample of nonwhite women, white women, nonwhite men, and white
men in the workplace (Kotkin 2009), making it more difficult to
document intersectional discrimination than it is to document dis-
crimination based on only one characteristic. While we cannot
measure doctrinal barriers and evidentiary hurdles directly, we
examine whether the opinion results from a motion to dismiss or a
defendant's motion for summary judgment. In a motion to dismiss,
the employer argues that there is no need to consider the facts of the
case, since the plaintiffs claims are inconsistent with legal doctrine.
In a motion for summary judgment, the defendant argues that the
plaintiffs claims can be rejected because the plaintiff has failed to
adduce evidence in discovery from which a reasonable jury could
find in their favor at trial. If many intersectional cases are losing on
" Occupational prestige is missing for 20 percent of the sample. We assigned these
cases the mean prestige score and included a dummy variable indicating which cases had
missing prestige data.
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summary judgment instead of on considerations of the facts of the
case, this could indicate that procedural barriers or evidentiary
hurdles are preventing intersectional claims from succeeding.
Control Variables
We control for several variables predicted to be correlated with
employee victory: whether the case is in the circuit or district court,
whether the opinion is legally published," the length of the opinion
in pages, the number of employer actions the employee is challeng-
ing, and the passage of time.20 To account for change over time, we
control for whether the case was decided after 1986, when the
Celotex trilogy of decisions21 made it easier to obtain summary judg-
ment and the Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986) decision stated
that employers would be more likely to prevail in some types of
EEO cases if they had established certain employment structures,
such as antiharassment policies and grievance procedures
(Edelman et al. 2011). We also ran all models with dummy variables
for each year to completely account for any time patterns; our
results were substantively unchanged.
Analysis
Our dependent variable has three categories: employer victory,
mixed outcome, and employee victory. Our results were extremely
robust to model selection: we obtained substantively equivalent
results from ordered, multinomial, and generalized ordered logis-
tic regression." We selected the generalized ordered logistic regres-
sion model because its moving base category makes its coefficients
" When judges declare that a decision is not for publication, it is in theory not relevant
beyond the specific case for which it is issued and does not constitute precedent. Today,
approximately 80 percent of circuit court opinions and the vast majority of district court
opinions are unpublished (Gerken 2004).
20 In other models, we controlled for disparate impact, disparate treatment, and
hostile work environment claims. Including these variables did not affect the intersection-
ality coefficients, and none were statistically significant predictors of employee victory.
21 In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986), Matsushita Electric Industries Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
Corp. (1986), and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (1984), the Supreme Court gave federal
judges more leeway to grant employers' motions for summary judgment. After the Celotex
cases, as Second Circuit judge Patricia Wald observed, summary judgment evolved from
being a limited device to eliminate patently frivolous claims to "something more like a
gestalt verdict based on an early snapshot of the case" (Wald 1998: 1917).
2 We initially ran our models using ordered logistic regression, which produces
parsimonious results by assuming that all coefficients are identical across all levels of the
dependent variable (Long 1997). We tested this assumption using Stata's omodel and brant
commands (Brant 1990; Wolfe & Gould 1998). Both results were statistically significant
(X'(1 2 ) = 70.8 and 74.8, respectively; p < 0.000), indicating that the ordered logit model
does not fit our data. We then considered multinomial logistic and generalized ordered
logistic regression models, which had similar log likelihoods and produced substantively
equivalent results (results available from the authors upon request).
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more intuitively interpretable than are the coefficients from multi-
nomial logistic regression. In each model, the first column of coef-
ficients refers to the plaintifs odds of achieving at least a partial
victory, while the second column refers to the plaintiffs odds of a
complete victory.
Results
The Increasing Prevalence of Intersectional Claims
Intersectional claims have increased dramatically over time. In
the 1970s and 1980s, less than 10 percent of EEO opinions dealt
with intersectional claims. As shown in Figure 1, the proportion
began rising around 1990, and by the second half of the decade,
more than a quarter of EEO opinions involved intersectional
claims." The proportion dropped somewhat in 1999, but since this
is the last year we observe, we cannot discern whether this was a
change in the trend or a temporary aberration. Since the total
number of EEO opinions rose dramatically during this time period,
the increasing proportion of intersectional claims indicates an even
more dramatic increase in real numbers: we estimate that there





1980 1985 1990 1995 200
Year
Figure 1. Percent of EEO cases with intersectional claims.
*Figure I begins in 1980 because of small sample sizes in the 1970s. The pooled
proportions from the 1970s are equivalent to those in the 1980s.
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circuit courts in the 1970s and 1980s and over 1,000 per year by the
second half of the 1990s. This increasing prevalence highlights the
importance of learning how these claims are faring.
Both Demographic and Claim Intersectionality
Disadvantage Plaintiffs
Bivariate relationships between both claim and demographic
intersectionality and case outcomes yield strong support for inter-
sectionality theory. First, plaintiffs making intersectional claims are
less than half as likely to win their cases as are other plaintiffs (15
percent compared to 31 percent; see Table 4). Second, race and sex
disadvantages do not operate independently. White male plaintiffs
were more likely to lose their cases than white women were (61
percent as compared to 55 percent; see Table 4). This female
advantage, however, does not apply to black women, who are
slightly more likely than black men to lose their cases (71 percent as
compared to 69 percent; see Table 4).24
The bivariate relationships between both types of intersection-
ality and employee victory provide suggestive evidence of an
intersectionality penalty. Next, we conducted generalized ordered
logistic regressions to control for other features of cases that
might account for the relationships (see Table 5). In each model
we present, the first column of coefficients denotes each variable's
effects on the odds that the plaintiff will achieve at least a partial
victory (a mixed outcome or a complete victory), and the
second column of coefficients focuses on the odds of a complete
victory.
Model 1 (Table 5) shows the effects of claim intersectionality
on the likelihood of employee victory. Even when controlling for




Intersectional bases of discrimination (N= 178) 69% 16% 15%
Nonintersectional bases of discrimination (N= 836) 56% 14% 30%
Demographic intersectionality
White male plaintiff (N = 36) 61% 3% 36%
White female plaintiff (N = 20) 55% 10% 35%
Nonwhite male plaintiff (N = 196) 69% 14% 17%
Nonwhite female plaintiff (N= 109) 71% 17% 13%
Plaintiff's race or sex is missing (N= 653) 53% 15% 32%
24 The demographic intersectionality section of Table 4 compares outcomes for plain-
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multiple aspects of the case, compared to plaintiffs who allege a
single basis of discrimination, plaintiffs making intersectional
claims have only about half the odds of attaining at least a partial
victory and approximately one-third the odds of a complete vic-
tory." All else equal, we predict that plaintiffs alleging only one
basis of discrimination will win their cases 28 percent of the time,
whereas plaintiffs bringing otherwise identical cases that allege
intersectional bases of discrimination will win only 13 percent of
the time.2' This finding provides strong evidence for the hypoth-
esis that EEO law disadvantages plaintiffs who allege intersec-
tional discrimination.
One interpretation of this finding might be that cases alleging
multiple types of discrimination were intrinsically weaker, with des-
perate plaintiffs adding bases of discrimination and hoping that one
would be successful. At least one federal judge adopts this view,
suggesting that plaintiffs who allege multiple bases of discrimina-
tion are "throwing spaghetti at the wall to see what sticks" (district
court judge Ruben Castillo, quoted in Kotkin 2009: 1442). We test
for this possibility in three ways. First, we control for multiple
challenged actions because desperate plaintiffs might be just as
likely to challenge multiple employer actions (e.g., compensation
and promotion) as to allege multiple bases of discrimination. We do
find a significant negative effect of the number of challenged
actions on complete plaintiff victory, but the effect's magnitude is
much smaller than is the claim intersectionality effect. Second, if
desperate plaintiffs were likely to add both challenged actions and
bases of discrimination to their cases, then controlling for the
number of challenged actions would decrease the size of the coef-
ficient for intersectional claims. In fact, including the number of
challenged actions in the model has no such effect. Third, if alleg-
ing multiple bases of discrimination were an indicator of intrinsi-
cally weak cases, it should not matter whether or not the additional
alleged bases of discrimination are based on ascriptive characteris-
tics. Our results show that whether the bases of discrimination are
ascriptive or not matters: we find a large significant negative effect
for intersectional claims (those alleging discrimination based on
multiple ascriptive characteristics), but only a small, marginally
significant effect for cases alleging multiple nonintersectional bases
of discrimination (that is, cases in which only one or none of the
alleged bases of discrimination is an ascriptive characteristic). These
2 Odds ratios are obtained by exponentiating the coefficients.
We calculated these predicted probabilities with all control variables held constant at
their means or modes (two challenged employer actions, district court, published opinion,
seven pages long, and post-1986).
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findings suggest that intersectional claims are not the result of
plaintiffs' frivolously adding additional claims.
Model 2 in Table 5 shows the effects of plaintiffs' demographics
on the likelihood of employee victory without considering demo-
graphic intersectionality. Besides the control variables, Model 2
includes only the main effects for race and sex, which are measured
by dummy variables for nonwhite plaintiffs and plaintiffs with
missing race data (white plaintiffs are the omitted category) and
variables for female plaintiffs and plaintiffs with missing sex data
(male plaintiffs are the omitted category). Model 2 shows that all
else equal, nonwhite plaintiffs have less than one-third of white
plaintiffs' odds of achieving complete victories. Female plaintiffs are
slightly more likely than male plaintiffs to achieve at least partial
victories, but this coefficient is significant only at the .1 level." If we
stopped at Model 2 (hence ignoring demographic intersectional-
ity), as do previous studies, we would likely conclude that there are
no important differences between men's and women's outcomes in
EEO litigation.
Model 3 improves on Model 2 (and on previous research)
because it accounts for demographic intersectionality by including
a variable set to one if the plaintiff is a nonwhite woman. The
interaction effect has a negative and statistically significant effect on
plaintiffs' odds of at least partial victory and on plaintiffs' odds of
complete victory. When we include it in the model, the main effect
for sex becomes a significant predictor of at least partial plaintiff
victory.
Based on Model 3, and holding all control variables constant at
their means or modes, white women have the highest predicted
probability of a full victory (38 percent), followed by white men (31
percent), nonwhite men (15 percent), and nonwhite women (11
percent)." This intersectional relationship between race and sex
can be understood in two ways. First, there are larger race effects
for women than for men: nonwhite women fall further behind
white women than nonwhite men fall behind white men. Second,
" While these results suggest that intersectional claims are not inherently weaker than
other claims, the merit of cases cannot be conclusively discerned from written judicial
opinions. A fuller measure of merit would require examination of the briefs, depositions,
testimony, and other materials submitted in the context of litigation, independently meas-
uring the underlying merit of cases and the law's construction of merit. Such an inquiry is
beyond the scope of this analysis.
" Plaintiffs with missing sex were also significantly more likely to win their cases than
were male plaintiffs. Most of this pattern is explained by the fact that many of these cases
are class actions, which have high rates of plaintiff victory and also often have a mixed-sex
group of plaintiffs.
" Kluegel and Smith (1986) show that Americans tend to be skeptical of the existence
of racial discrimination while giving more credence to the idea that white women face sex
discrimination. This pattern may help explain white women's high win rates.
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there are different gender effects for whites and nonwhites: white
women get ahead of white men, while nonwhite women fare simi-
larly to nonwhite men."o Our findings, then, suggest that studies
that fail to account for demographic intersectionality miss the fact
that sex and race disadvantages do not operate independently in
the courts.
Whereas Models 1 and 3 in Table 5 consider demographic and
claim intersectionality separately, Model 4 includes both, thus
allowing us to test whether either intersectionality effect is an arti-
fact of omitted variable bias. Given that plaintiffs making intersec-
tional claims are disproportionately likely to be nonwhite women
(see Table 3), the effect of claim intersectionality observed in Model
1 might actually reflect nonwhite women's disadvantage. Alterna-
tively, the negative coefficient for nonwhite women in Model 3
might be explained by the fact that nonwhite women are dispro-
portionately likely to make intersectional claims (see Table 3).
Model 5 shows, however, that each type of intersectionality has an
independent effect on plaintiffs' likelihood of winning. The claim
intersectionality coefficient remains statistically significant and
decreases only slightly. Regarding demographic intersectionality,
the interaction effect between plaintiffs' race and sex is only signifi-
cant at the p < 0.1 level in Model 4, but its magnitude is virtually
unchanged. The fact that the coefficients for both measures of
intersectionality remain large and at least marginally statistically
significant when included in the same model suggests that demo-
graphic and claim intersectionality represent two distinct pathways
of disadvantage for plaintiffs. Demographic and claim intersection-
ality are each associated with dramatically reduced odds of plaintiff
victory.
Figures 2 and 3 show the magnitude of the effects of each type
of intersectionality, net of the other, with all other variables held
constant at their means or modes. Figure 2 shows the effects of
claim intersectionality net of demographic intersectionality by
giving the predicted probabilities of complete victories for non-
white female plaintiffs who do and do not assert intersectional
claims. Even among nonwhite female plaintiffs, intersectional
claims are predicted to prevail only half as often as single claims.
Figure 3 shows the effects of demographic intersectionality net of
claim intersectionality by giving the predicted probabilities of com-
plete victories in single-claim cases for plaintiffs at each intersection
of race and sex. Even when controlling for their increased likeli-
hood of making intersectional claims, nonwhite female plaintiffs
still have the lowest predicted probability of winning their cases.












Intersectional claims One basis of Multiple bases, not
discrimination intersectional
Figure 2. Effects of claim intersectionality, net of demographic
intersectionality: predicted probabilities of complete employee victory for
nonwhite women, holding controls constant at their means or modes.
Nonwhite men White men White women
Figure 3. Effects of demographic intersectionality, net of claim
intersectionality: predicted probabilities of complete employee victory for
single-claim cases, holding controls constant at their means or modes.
Mediating Variables: Mechanisms for the Intersectionality Penalty
To explore how intersectionality disadvantages plaintiffs, we
consider several variables that might mediate the effects of demo-




























































































































































we sequentially add mediating variables to Model 4 to see whether
they decrease the size and significance of the claim intersectionality
coefficient or the race/sex interaction effect. Model 4 is repeated in
Table 6 for comparison of the coefficients. Mediating variables that
decrease the effects of the intersectionality variables tell us some-
thing about how the intersectionality penalty works.
First, to test Smith's (1991) hypothesis that intersectional claims
fare especially poorly when plaintiffs bring claims under both
Section 1981 and Title VII, Model 5 adds a dummy variable set to
one when the plaintiff brings claims under both statutes and an
interaction effect between this variable and intersectional claims.
Consistent with Smith's argument, there is a large negative inter-
action effect between intersectional claims and the Title VII/Section
1981 combination on the odds of employee victory. The coefficient
is large, but is only significant at the .1 level; it becomes larger and
statistically significant with the inclusion of more control variables
in Models 6 and 7. The Title VII/Section 1981 combination is
actually advantageous when not combined with intersectional
claims; plaintiffs alleging only one type of discrimination under
both Title VII and Section 1981 have a higher predicted probabil-
ity of a full victory (37 percent) than plaintiffs who do not combine
the two statutes (30 percent). Intersectional claims have lower rates
of plaintiff victory even without this particular combination of stat-
utes (19 percent), and plaintiffs who make intersectional claims
under both Title VII and Section 1981 have the lowest win rate of
all (10 percent).' Thus, Smith is correct that plaintiffs who make
intersectional claims under the two statutes are especially unlikely
to win their cases.
Next, we explore whether judicial deference to organizational
structures mediates the effects of intersectionality. As mentioned
earlier, legal endogeneity theory (Edelman et al. 1999; Edelman
et al. 2011) suggests that judges may be especially likely to view
institutionalized structures such as grievance procedures or formal
notice policies as evidence of nondiscriminatory treatment when
they are skeptical of the plaintiffs or their claims, making judicial
deference a potential mechanism for the intersectionality penalty.
Model 6 in Table 6 explores this possibility by including a dichoto-
mous variable indicating whether any structures were deferred to.3 1
" Predicted probabilities were calculated with all control variables set at their means or
modes.
" The judicial deference variable is set to one where judges viewed the presence of an
organizational structure as potential evidence of nondiscrimination and the opinion reflects
no consideration of the quality or adequacy of the structure, explicitly states that the
structure is inadequate but that the inadequacy does not matter, or gives superficial
consideration to the question of adequacy but the opinion includes clear indicators that the
structure was inadequate.
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When we include judicial deference in the model, the coefficients
for plaintiffs' demographics remain virtually unchanged; thus,
judicial deference does not mediate the effects of demographic
intersectionality. Likewise, the interaction effect between claim
intersectionality and the Title VII/Section 1981 combination
remains large and statistically significant. However, the main effect
for claim intersectionality is reduced by half and loses statistical
significance. Thus, in cases with intersectional claims that do not
involve both Title VII and Section 1981, judges are more likely to
defer to employers' structures, and this increased likelihood of
deference is an important mediator of the disadvantage faced by
plaintiffs bringing intersectional claims.
In Model 7, we add three indicators of the resources available
to plaintiffs (unionization, involvement of government or public-
interest organizations, and plaintiffs' occupational prestige) and
two variables related to the procedural posture that may indicate
the presence of doctrinal barriers or evidentiary hurdles (motion
to dismiss and summary judgment). When these variables are
included, the coefficients for the claim intersectionality main effect
decrease further; however, they were already small and nonsignifi-
cant before the addition of these controls. Including the new vari-
ables has little effect on any of the coefficients for plaintiffs'
demographics and actually increases the coefficient for the claim
intersectionality/Title VII/Section 1981 interaction effect. Thus,
our rough measures of resources, doctrinal barriers, and eviden-
tiary hurdles explain little to none of the claim and demographic
intersectionality penalties. 3
Discussion
Our analysis provides the first systematic empirical test of inter-
sectionality theory by examining the effects of both demographic
intersectionality and claim intersectionality on plaintiff win rates in
employment discrimination cases. We find strong support for the
ideas that race and sex disadvantages do not operate independ-
ently in the courts (demographic intersectionality) and that antidis-
crimination law provides less protection in cases that involve
intersecting bases of discrimination (claim intersectionality).
3 In other models, we also controlled for judges' political orientations, measured
using the judicial common space score method proposed by Giles et al. (2001). Michael
Giles generously provided us with scores for circuit courtjudges, and we used data from the
National judicial Center to calculate scores for district court judges. Judges' political
orientations were not statistically significant and did not affect the intersectionality
coefficients.
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Our results suggest, moreover, that these two types of intersec-
tionality represent two distinct processes of disadvantage. Although
nonwhite women are more likely to bring intersectional claims, this
does not explain all of the disadvantage they face in court. Likewise,
claim intersectionality harms plaintiffs' chances of winning, regard-
less of their demographic characteristics. EEO law itself seems to
disadvantage intersectional plaintiffs, above and beyond any dis-
crimination they may face in the courtroom on the basis of their
race or sex.
Previous research suggested three main reasons why intersec-
tional claims might disadvantage plaintiffs: (1) the categorical
nature of discrimination law creates doctrinal barriers to intersec-
tional claims, (2) there are evidentiary hurdles to demonstrating
intersectional discrimination, and (3) judicial skepticism about
intersectional claims may make intersectional plaintiffs less likely
to win their cases. Our findings suggest that the Title VII/Section
1981 combination does pose a doctrinal barrier that mediates the
effects of claim intersectionality and thus supports Smith's (1991)
argument that judges tend to believe that intersectional claims can
be neatly separated and that a ruling against the plaintiffs' race
allegations under Section 1981 prohibits consideration of race
intersections under Title VII. Our findings also suggest that judi-
cial deference may be an important mechanism through which
claim intersectionality penalizes plaintiffs. Controlling for judicial
deference explains most of the claim intersectionality penalty
for cases that are not brought under both Title VII and Section
1981. The fact that judicial deference is especially likely in cases
involving intersectional claims elaborates Edelman et al.'s (1999,
2011) suggestion that judges treat institutionalized organizational
structures as symbolic indicia of employers' rationality and
compliance. In sum, although our data do not permit a direct test
of the mechanisms through which intersectionality operates,
we find some support for the ideas that intersectional claims are
held back by a combination of doctrinal barriers and judicial
interpretations.
Our findings have important implications for several theoreti-
cal debates in the intersectionality literature. One point of disa-
greement among scholars is whether intersectionality applies only
to members of traditionally disadvantaged groups or whether all
identities are intersectional (Browne & Misra 2003; Davis 2008;
Nash 2008). Some researchers subscribe to a "multiple jeopardy"
approach that assumes that women of color are more disadvan-
taged than other groups in all contexts (King 1988; Ransford
1980). However, recent critiques of the intersectionality literature
from within argue that when limited to the case of black women,
intersectionality is insufficiently developed as a general theory
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(Nash 2008), and view intersectionality as a broader theory
that can apply "to any grouping of people, advantaged as well as
disadvantaged" (Yuval-Davis 2006, 201; see also Chang &
Culp 2002; Kwan 1996; Zack 2005). A related debate focuses
on whether intersectional disadvantages are "ubiquitous or
contingent" (Browne & Misra 2003: 492). Some scholars argue
that intersectionality affects outcomes and experiences in every
social setting (Collins 1990; Weber 2001), while others suggest
that its effects are contingent, with single categories sometimes
dominating (McCall 2005; Yuval-Davis 2006). Our findings dem-
onstrate that intersectionality is context dependent. Whereas
intersectionality theory generally presumes that white men tend
to fare the best and nonwhite women are the most disadvantaged,
our findings suggest a somewhat different pattern. In our sample,
white female plaintiffs had the highest chances of winning
their cases, a pattern that is likely specific to the context of EEO
litigation.
Our analysis also has methodological implications for the inter-
sectionality literature. Most of the intersectionality literature to date
has employed rich qualitative analyses, which have revealed much
about the nature of intersectional disadvantage and intersectionali-
ty's effects on particular plaintiffs and in particular cases. But until
now, we have known little about the general effects of intersection-
ality on litigation outcomes. Our work demonstrates the power of
quantitative methods and categorization for documenting inequali-
ties in litigation and judicial decisionmaking.
In addition to contributing to the intersectionality literature in
critical race theory, our work has important implications for emerg-
ing research in social psychology and stratification, which demon-
strates that intersectional discrimination occurs in the labor market.
Our findings regarding demographic intersectionality demonstrate
that intersecting demographic characteristics shape outcomes in
the courts as well as in the labor market. Moreover, our findings
regarding claim intersectionality establish that EEO law provides
little protection for plaintiffs facing intersectional discrimination in
the labor market.
Plaintiffs who suffer multiple disadvantages in society fare
worse than do singly disadvantaged plaintiffs when they seek to
assert their civil rights in court. This disadvantage operates both
through demographic intersectionality, where the intersection of
race and sex puts black women at a disadvantage, and through
claim intersectionality, where those who assert two or more types of
discrimination fare worse than do those whose cases are simpler.
By assuming that disadvantages based on race, sex, and other
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